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HOSPITALS AND AIDS DISCRIMINATION:
APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL
DISCRIMINATION LAWS TO
HCWS AND STAFF
PHYSICIANS
Scenario (1): a doctor performs emergency surgery on a patient
Scenario (2): a health care worker (HCW) prepares a blood
transfusion
Scenario (3): a nurse assists a doctor during a surgical procedure
In any of these situations an accidental slip of a scalpel or other sharp
instrument could bring about the possibility of blood-to-blood contact
among hospital personnel or between hospital personnel and patients. If any
one of these HCWs is afflicted with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS),' the theoretical possibility of transmitting the virus is of immediate
concern.
2
Since the emergence of HIV infection, the epidemic has understandably
been at the forefront of concern for hospitals. While hospitals battle with
issues relating to their patients with HIV infection,3 they must also take care
not to ignore the problems of their HIV infected staff and employees. In
September of 1988, when the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported
61,929 adult AIDS cases, 5.1% (or 3,182) of the afflicted individuals were
1. On June 24, 1989 the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus Epidemic stated that "[t]he term 'AIDS' is obsolete." The Commission report suggested
that the term HIV infection "more correctly defines the problem." PRESIDENTIAL COMMIS-
SION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, XVII (Jun. 24, 1988).
For the purposes of this Comment when it is necessary to make a distinction, the term
"AIDS" will refer to the full-blown AIDS syndrome (see infra notes 11-13) and the CDC's
definition of AIDS (see infra note 15); the term ARC will refer to AIDS Related Complex (see
infra note 18); the term HIV seropositivity will refer to those individuals who test positive for
antibodies but are asymptomatic (see infra note 16).
2. Although, to date, no such cases have been reported, the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) recognizes this possibility. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preven-
tion of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 15 (1987) [hereinafter Recommendations].
3. See Note, Between A Rock and a Hard Place: AIDS and the Conflicting Physician's
Duty of Preventing Disease Transmission and Safeguarding Confidentiality, 76 GEO. L.J. 169
(1987) for a discussion of issues relating to medical practitioners' duties to third party contacts
of AIDS-afflicted individuals, HCWS who work with infected patients, and issues relating to
the testing of hospital patients.
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HCWs.
This Comment will focus on the applicability of discrimination legislation
to hospital-employed HCWs and physicians with hospital staff privileges. In
recent years there has been much discussion regarding the problem of dis-
crimination against HIV infected individuals in the employment context in
general. 5 Hospitals, as employers, share many of the same concerns as other
employers with respect to their workers with AIDS.6 This Comment will
show that despite the obvious risks that arise in the health care environment,
under section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation and Other Services Act of
1973 (section 504)" HIV-infected HCWs will be classified as "qualified indi-
viduals"' and are thus entitled to protection under the Act. This Comment
will also compare section 504 with the proposed Americans With Disabili-
ties Act (hereinafter ADA).9 The added protection under the proposed law
and its implications for HIV-infected HCWs will be discussed. Because
these Acts were drafted for the purpose of protecting handicapped individu-
als, this Comment will also discuss the public policy considerations that led
to the proposal of the ADA and that have broadened the scope of section
504 to define HIV infected individuals as "handicapped."
The special concerns of hospitals in connection with HIV discrimination
center around safety. This Comment will discuss the hospital's interest in
4. Centers for Disease Control, Guidelines for Prevention of Transmission of Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Health-Care and Public Safety Workers, 38
MORnDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 6 (1989). This figure is comparable to the percent-
age of HCWS in the workforce at 5.7%. Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Im-
munodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection among Health Care
Workers, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 229 (1988).
5. See Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 681 (1986); Henry, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS AND THE LAW 41 (W. Dornette
ed. 1987); Note, Asymptomatic Infection With The AIDS Virus As A Handicap Under The
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1988) [hereinafter Note].
6. Employers may be tempted to discriminate against HIV infected employees because
they believe that:
(a) the worker is contagious and can spread AIDS or the other infectious diseases
with which he is often afflicted, or
(b) co-workers and clients may refuse to work or to do business with the employer
because of the presence of the afflicted worker.
See Henry, supra note 5. For a discussion of these issues in the health care environment, see
infra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
Employers, in general, may also be concerned with whether they can legally screen employ-
ees for seropositivity. Other issues arising with regard to testing employees involve the em-
ployer's ability to disclose the results of test and/or take action (e.g. termination or forced
leave) once the results are known. Focus is on Employment Issues at New York AIDS Confer-
ence, 23 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1613 (Nov. 11, 1985) [hereinafter Focus].
7. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
8. Id.
9. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
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preventing transmission both from HCW to patient and among HCWs, as
well as the possible liability that may result under such circumstances. An
analysis of the CDC's recommendations for safety in the health care envi-
ronment will follow. This Comment will conclude that it is very likely hos-
pitals implementing these guidelines are maintaining safe health care
facilities for the purposes of defending a cause of action brought by a patient
or employee alleging contamination by an infected HCW.
Finally, this Comment will examine the ability of staff physicians who are
not hospital employees to find protection under legislation that protects
"employees." Although no cases have arisen under section 504 in this con-
text, this Comment will examine the viability of a cause of action under
section 504 by analogy to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 Be-
cause the Rehabilitation Act was passed with the express purpose of prevent-
ing discrimination against handicapped individuals, this Comment will
conclude that it is likely these physicians will probably be protected by this
law as well.
I. HIV INFECTION: EPIDEMIOLOGY AND INCIDENCE
Persons afflicted with HIV infection, because of their depressed immune
systems, are susceptible to a number of opportunistic infections. Currently,
the medical knowledge of the disease is based on the theory that the presence
of the HTLV-III/LAV virus in an individual's blood stream causes the de-
struction of the body's T-helper cells." These T-cells are white blood cells
that activate the production of disease-fighting antibodies.' 2 Therefore, be-
cause these cells have been destroyed, the immune system is unable to re-
ceive the signal to produce the antibodies that would effectively fight
infection. Thus, the body is left vulnerable to foreign agents which the nor-
mal person can effectively defend.' 3 Rather than dying of "AIDS," persons
with the disease suffer from opportunistic illnesses such as pneumocystic
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
11. Leonard, supra note 5, at 684. See also Green, The Transmission of AIDS in AIDS
AND THE LAW, A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 29 (H. Dalton ed. 1987).
The AIDS virus, a retrovirus, is distinctive from most human viruses by virtue of its molecu-
lar structure. Unlike most organisms, retroviruses carry no DNA and instead have RNA as
their genetic material. Some retroviruses, including the AIDS virus, carry an enzyme that
allows them to transfer their genetic information from RNA into DNA. The virus is then
capable of taking that DNA and transferring it into the cells of the "infected host." Thus,
from a molecular biological perspective, the AIDS virus "creates new genes in the body of its
victims." Osborn, The AIDS Epidemic: Discovery of a New Disease in AIDS AND THE LAW, A
GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 17 (H. Dalton ed. 1987).
12. Leonard, supra note 5, at 684.
13. Id.
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carinii pneumonia and Kaposi's sarcoma. These diseases, although they are
prevalent among AIDS patients, are rare in the unafflicted population. 14
The CDC's revised definition of AIDS is based primarily on evidence of
"indicator diseases" and secondarily on the status of laboratory evidence of
HIV infection.15 Although blood tests such as the Enzyme-Linked Immu-
nosorbent Assay (ELISA) test can detect the HIV antibody, a positive test
does not indicate that the patient has or will develop the full-blown AIDS
syndrome.16 Individuals, then, may be seropositive and yet may not fit the
CDC's definition of AIDS. 17 Another group of individuals who do not fit
the revised definition of AIDS are those afflicted with AIDS Related Com-
plex (ARC). These individuals exhibit milder symptoms than those with the
full-blown AIDS syndrome and are similar to the seropositive individuals
because ARC does not necessarily predict future AIDS status."8
14. Id. See Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome-United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 17-21 (1986). Pneumo-
cystis carinii pneumonia is a rare nonbacterial pneumonia and Kaposi's sarcoma is a rare form
of cancer characterized by plaque-like lesions on the skin or mucous membranes. See Centers
for Disease Control, Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 13S (1987) [hereinafter
Revision of the CDC Surveillance].
15. The CDC defines AIDS by reference to the presence of the HTLV-III virus and the
positive diagnosis of diseases associated with the virus. Note, supra note 5, at 563 n. 1; Roth-
stein, Screening Workersfor AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAW, A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 130
(H. Dalton ed. 1987).
The revised definition of AIDS is organized into 3 parts: (1) Where HIV antibody tests are
not performed or give inconclusive results and no other disease or genetic syndrome is the
cause of immunodeficiency, then an individual fitting the description of any of the 12 diseases
(including pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and Kaposi's Sarcoma) listed (in part IB of this
issue) is diagnosed as having AIDS; (2) Regardless of the results of the HIV antibody test, if
the individual is definitely diagnosed with any of the 12 diseases listed in part IIA or is pre-
sumptively diagnosed with any of the 7 conditions specified in part IIB, it is indicative of
AIDS; (3) If the individual has a negative antibody test, he does not have AIDS unless there is
no other cause of his immunodeficiency and the patient has been definitively diagnosed as
having pneumocysitis pneumonia or any disease specified in part IIB and has a T-helper count
of less than 400/mm3. Revision of the CDC Surveillance, supra note 14, at 4S.
16. See Centers for Disease Control, Public Health Service Guidelinesfor Counseling and
Antibody Testing To Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 509 (1987). A positive antibody test indicates that the patient has been infected
with the AIDS virus. Individuals may not demonstrate symptoms or clinical evidence of infec-
tion for years. See also Rothstein, supra note 15, at 130 (for an in-depth description of the
AIDS antibody tests and their accuracy).
17. Rothstein, Medical Screening of Workers: Genetics, AIDS, and Beyond, 2 LAB. LAW.
675, 681 (1986). It has been estimated that only about 25 - 50% of seropositive individuals
develop AIDS within 5 - 10 years of contracting the virus. Rothstein, supra note 15, at 131
(citing INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS
91 (1986)).
18. Rothstein, supra note 15, at 131. Victims of ARC are characterized by symptoms
such as enlarged lymph nodes, shingles, weight loss, persistent fever, night sweats, persistent
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The CDC reports that because transmission is known only to occur via
"sexual contact, parenteral exposure to infected blood or blood components,
and perinatal transmission from mother to neonate,"19 the persons at risk
include "homosexual and bisexual men, intravenous (IV) drug abusers, per-
sons transfused with contaminated blood or blood products [and], heterosex-
ual contacts of persons with HTLV-III/LAV infection." 2°
Since 1981, when HIV infection was first recognized, the disease has be-
come pandemic.21 The figures are startling as the incidence of the disease
continues to rise at alarming rates. As of December 31, 1988, the CDC
reported a total number of 82,764 AIDS cases in the United States.22 More-
over, the CDC estimates that by 1992, a total of 365,000 people will be diag-
nosed with AIDS.23 Thus, as the incidence of the disease continues to rise in
the future, more and more Americans are likely to be directly affected by
HIV infection.
II. ORIGIN OF PUBLIC POLICY DEALING WITH HIV INFECTION
Throughout the centuries, the threat of infectious disease has struck a
chord of fear, not only with the public at large, but also with those individu-
als who have taken on the responsibility of caring for the afflicted.
24
dry cough or diarrhea and compromised immune function. Leonard, AIDS and Employment
Law Revisited, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 18 n.38 (1985). See Henry, supra note 5, at 34 ("It is
believed that between 5 and 20 percent of the persons with ARC will eventually develop
AIDS."). See also infra notes 48-50, 77-82 and accompanying text for a discussion as to
whether seropositive and ARC afflicted individuals will be defined as handicapped under sec-
tion 504.
19. Centers for Disease Control, Summary: Recommendations for Preventing Transmis-
sion of Infection with Human T-Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 681, 682 (1985) [hereinafter Summary].
20. Id.
21. Centers for Disease Control, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Precau-
tions for Health Care Workers and Allied Professionals, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP. 450 (1983). However, the CDC reports that although "[tihe number of AIDS
cases reported each year continues to increase .... the rate of increase has steadily declined
except in 1987, when the revision of the case definition resulted in an increase in reported
cases." Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United
States, 1981-1988, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 229 (1989) [hereinafter
Update].
22. Update, supra note 21, at 229.
23. Centers for Disease Control, AIDS and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in
the United States: 1988 Update, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 5, 6 (1989).
24. Guy de Chauliac, a surgeon during the time of black death, wrote about physicians'
fears during that catastrophe stating: "[flor self-preservation there was nothing better to do
than flee the region before becoming infected.., no one could approach or even see a patient
without taking the disease." Wallis, You Haven't Heard Anything Yet, TIME, Feb. 16, 1987, at
50, 54. See also B. TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR, THE CALAMITOUS 14TH CENTURY
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Although the public almost always fears those afflicted with newly discov-
ered diseases,25 the fear associated with HIV infection has its origin in a
number of sources. When HIV infection first emerged on the American
scene, it was popularly regarded by the general public as "the gay plague. '
26
Much of the animosity towards HIV infected individuals originated from the
fact that victims were nearly always either homosexual, bisexual or IV drug
users.27 Thus, to many, the AIDS victims were getting what they de-
served.2' The prejudice against homosexuals was compounded by ignorance
regarding the transmissibility of the disease. As the public learned of the
nearly certain mortality rate of the disease, a diagnosis became a death sen-
tence and the prejudice against the afflicted grew.29 As a result, individuals
were often rejected by their family, friends and, in some cases, the health
care institutions that were supposed to provide them with medical
attention.30
(1988) (for a discussion of the Black Plague and an analysis of the community reaction to the
disease).
25. "[S]ociety generally has reacted very poorly to epidemics." Henry, supra note 5, at
32.
26. See Wallis, The Big Chill: Fear of AIDS, TIME, Feb. 16, 1987, at 50. "At first AIDS
seemed an affliction of drug addicts and especially homosexuals, 'a gay disease.'" Id.
27. As of September 12, 1988, 89% of AIDS victims are either homosexual, bisexual or
IV drug uses. AIDS Weekly Surveillance Report, U.S. AIDS PROGRAM, CENTERS FOR INFEC-
TIOUS DISEASE, (Sept. 12, 1988).
28. Evidence of this school of thought is prevalent, especially with conservative religious
groups. Bob Grant, chairman of the Christian Voice lobbying organization, explained,
"[i]nitially most traditional-value types saw AIDS as a natural cause and effect .... People
with unsafe and immoral behavior were reaping its results." Stanley, AIDS Becomes a Political
Issue, TIME, Mar. 23, 1987, at 24 [hereinafter AIDS Becomes]. AIDS has also been perceived
as a punishment handed down from God. Wallis, supra note 26, at 51. See also McAuliffe,
AIDS at the Dawn of Fear, 102 U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 12, 1987, at 60, 62 ("mem-
bers of the religious right.., see AIDS as God's rough justice for the sin of homosexuality.").
29. Sullivan, Blood Center Fear Impact of AIDS Test, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1985, at B1,
col. 5. The New York City Commission on Human Rights reported an increase in the number
of discrimination claims brought by homosexuals. According to the Commission, the increase
in prejudice against homosexuals is due at least in part to the HIV epidemic. Leonard, supra
note 5, at 683, n.8.
30. "Many medical professionals are refusing to treat people with AIDS, even though
current medical studies indicate that the occupational risk of transmission of the Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus (HIV) is minimal." Banks, The Right to Medical Treatment in AIDS
AND THE LAW, A GUIDE TO THE PUBLIC 175 (H. Dalton ed. 1987).
The risk of transmitting infection from surgeon to patient cannot be determined exactly.
However, because Hepatitis B is spread by similar modes of transmission, it has been used as
the basis for a comparison in estimating the risk of transmission for HIV infection. Based on
these calculations, it has been estimated that seroconversion in the operating room can occur
on a range between 1 per 143,000 cases to 1 per 478 cases. Comment, The AIDS Project:
Creating a Public Health Policy-Rights and Obligations of Health Care Workers, 48 MD. L.
REV. 106, 117 n.85 (1989) [hereinafter Comment].
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Therefore, the policy behind issues relating to the HIV epidemic is much
different than that for other serious life-threatening diseases.3 1 Rather than
being treated as a medical issue, AIDS was treated primarily as a civil rights
and political issue.32 Therefore, AIDS policy discussions have been focused
toward protecting the gay community and HIV infected persons, in general,
from discrimination.
33
III. HIV INFECTION: THE REHABILITATION ACT AND
APPLICABLE CASE LAW
The applicability of discrimination legislation to HIV infected individuals
can be traced to a recent Supreme Court case. In School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline,34 the Supreme Court was presented with the issue of
whether persons with contagious diseases were protected under section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 35 Section 504 of the Act provides that
"[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ...
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."36 In Arline, the
plaintiff, a grade school teacher, was afflicted with recurrent tuberculosis
(TB). The school board, acting upon the belief that Ms. Arline could infect
her students with the disease, relieved her of her position. She brought suit
under section 504 claiming that she was a handicapped individual and that
the school board owed her a duty of reasonable accommodation. According
to the Act, a handicapped individual is one who "(i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities (ii) has a record of such impairment or (iii) is regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment."' 37 The Court, based on medical testimony, held
that TB affected Ms. Arline's respiratory system to such an extent that she
did in fact have a physical impairment. 38 The Court found that her hospital-
ization, as a result of this condition, was "more than sufficient to establish"
31. However, "[a]s a society, we have not had to address any epidemics of major infec-
tious diseases since polio. This good fortune means that we lack recent social and political
experience in dealing with such problems." Brandt, A Historical Perspective in AIDS AND THE
LAW, A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 42 (H. Dalton ed. 1987).
32. AIDS Becomes, supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
35. Section 504 is part of Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
38. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
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that Ms. Arline had been limited in a major life activity.39
The language of section 504 only protects "otherwise qualified" handi-
capped individuals. The Department of Health and Human Services regula-
tions, pursuant to the Act, define a "qualified handicapped person" as one
who, "with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the job."' Because the statute imposed on the employer an affirmative
duty to provide the reasonable accommodation to the handicapped em-
ployee, the Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination
of whether Ms. Arline was otherwise qualified and whether reasonable ac-
commodation was possible.41 To assist the lower court in its decision of
whether Ms. Arline was "otherwise qualified," the Court implemented
guidelines based on criteria recommended by the American Medical Associ-
ation (AMA):
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted),
(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),
(c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third par-
ties), and
(d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause
varying degrees of harm.42
Furthermore, the Court acknowledged the relevance that this decision
would carry for victims of HIV infected persons.43 Because the question was
not before the Court, the Court did not rule on the issue of whether an
individual who only tested seropositive for TB and whose "handicap" would
be contagiousness, would be deemed "handicapped" for the purposes of sec-
tion 504. However, the statute provides that in addition to those who suffer
from a physical or mental impairment, those who are "regarded as having
such an impairment" are also handicapped.' The Court, in Arline, ex-
plained the policy reasons underlying this provision:
39. Id.
40. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1987).
41. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289.
42. Id. at 288.
43. Id. at 282 n.7.
44. At the time of the Arline decision, the Justice department's official position was that
persons with AIDS should not be covered by federal discrimination laws at all. The Depart-
ment of Justice opinion stated that an employer's fear of contagion in the workplace should be
a legitimate defense for discriminatory employment practice. Charge of Bias Based on AIDS
Filed Against Florida Hospital, 185 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-3 (Sept. 24, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Charge].
On September 27, 1988, the Department formally reversed its position. Today, the Depart-
ment supports the protection of persons with AIDS, as well as HIV-seropositive individuals,
under the Act. Marcus, Justice Dept. Reverses Stance on AIDS Bias, Wash. Post, Oct. 7, 1988,
at AI, col. 1.
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Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. Few as-
pects of a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear as
contagiousness. Even those who suffer or have recovered from
such noninfectious diseases as epilepsy or cancer have faced dis-
crimination based on the irrational fear that they might be conta-
gious. The Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive
reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on
reasoned and medically sound judgment.45
These concerns for protecting handicapped individuals as well as those who
are regarded as being handicapped are compatible with the prevalent civil
rights interest in protecting persons with HIV infection and the gay commu-
nity from discrimination.4"
In general, the application of the Court's decision is readily apparent to
persons with AIDS or ARC. As Ms. Arline was considered to be handi-
capped because she suffered a physical impairment to her lungs, it is undeni-
able that the damage an AIDS or ARC afflicted individual sustains to his or
her immune and hemic system is likewise considered to be a physical impair-
ment.47 Although not specifically addressed in Arline, today individuals
who test seropositive (but who do not exhibit the manifest symptoms of
AIDS) or who have ARC will probably be protected under section 504.48
These individuals are "regarded as having an impairment" because of the
"general perception" of them as AIDS carriers.49 Thus, individuals who are
45. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284, 285.
46. Many of the cases of discrimination against HIV infected individuals stem from fear
of contagion. See AIDS Cases Prompt a Host of Law Suits, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1987, at 37, col.
3 (cited in Note, supra note 5, at 573).
47. Physical impairment refers to "any physiological disorder or condition ... affecting
one or more of the following body systems ... respiratory ... hemic and lymphatic." 45
C.F.R. § 84.3Q)(2)() (1988). See also Doe v. Dolton Elementary School Dist., 694 F. Supp
440 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); Ray v. Dist. of Desoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987). See also Note,
supra note 5, at 572 (citing the AMA's amicus curiae memorandum for Ray, for the principle
that individuals who are seropositive but manifest no symptoms of AIDS or ARC will be
considered to be impaired for the purposes of section 504: "viral infection is quite clearly a
physical 'impairment' in the ordinary sense of the word.").
48. See Leonard, AIDS in the Workplace in AIDS AND THE LAW A GUIDE TO THE
PUBLIC I11-12 (H. Dalton ed. 1987); Henry, supra note 5, at 42 (citing Cronan v. New Eng-
land Tel.& Telegraph Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Case (BNA) 1268, 1273 (D. Mass. Apr. 11,
1986)). The court found under a state discrimination statute that "a handicapped person [who
was barred from returning to work] solely on the employer's erroneous perception of him as
someone who is contagious to coworkers" qualified as being "regarded as having an impair-
ment." Cf supra note 44 and accompanying text.
49. Leonard, supra note 5, at 691.
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seropositive and have no other impairments are also "generally perceived"
as having AIDS although they do not meet the CDC definition of AIDS.
They, too, will most likely be protected under section 504 as handicapped
individuals.5" Therefore, when interpreting the Act to apply to HIV-sero-
positive individuals, both a construction of the language and an examination
of the underlying policy considerations will result in the classification of
such persons as "being regarded as having a physical or mental
impairment."
Once "physical impairment" has been established, in order to fulfil the
rest of the statutory definition of handicap, the afflicted employee must
demonstrate that he or she has a substantial limitation to a major life activ-
ity. The HHS regulations specify employment as one of the "major life ac-
tivities."'" The flexibility of this requirement is demonstrated in Doe v.
Dolton Elementary School Dist. 52 In this case, the court determined that a
student with HIV infection was "substantially impaired in his ability to in-
teract with others, e.g., to attend public school."5 3 The court found that
"[s]uch interaction is a major life activity.",54 Thus, once an individual has
shown that he is "physically impaired" and that he is "substantially limited"
in his ability to retain or procure employment, he will fulfil the threshold
requirement as a "handicapped individual" under section 504.
After it has been determined that an individual is handicapped, the perti-
nent questions that arise are whether the individual is "otherwise qualified"
and whether he can be "reasonably accommodated." On remand, the dis-
trict court in Airline utilized the AMA standards and found that Ms. Arline
was, in fact, "otherwise qualified" to teach because she could perform the
essential functions of the job." The district court first evaluated the nature
and duration of the risk. The court concluded that TB is difficult to trans-
50. Such an interpretation has been found to be consistent with the intent of section 504
and the HHS regulations which do not limit the definition of handicap to the conditions listed
in the statute. Note, supra note 5, at 571. See, e.g., Ray v. School District of DeSoto County,
666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (where three boys who tested seropositive for AIDS could
not be prohibited from attending school).
51. Major life activities also include communication, ambulation, selfcare, socialization,
vocational training, transportation, adapting to housing, caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, hearing, speaking, breathing and learning. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.54, App. A
(1989); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3.()(2)(i-ii) (1988).
52. 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
53. Id. at 444.
54. Id. A number of other courts have found that HIV-infected individuals would qualify
as handicapped. See Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal
1987); Ray, 666 F. Supp. at 1524; District 27 Community School Bd. v. Board of Educ., 130
Misc. 2d 398, 502 N.Y.S. 2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
55. Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
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mit56 and used the fact that Ms. Arline's own family had never been infected
as evidence that the risk of transmission was small.57 Therefore, based on
these facts, the court found that Ms. Arline's infection did not pose a signifi-
cant risk to her students.
The court next looked at the severity of the risk. The court found that
because there is a cure for TB, infected individuals who are treated early are
not likely to be afflicted with permanent physical harm. Thus, the court held
that the risk was not severe.5" Finally, the court considered the probability
of transmission and harm. Because of the limited time that Arline spent
with her students, the fact that she had been on medication, and the fact that
no one in her own family had ever tested positive for the disease, the court
found that "the probability that she would transmit the disease to anyone
was so extremely small as to not exist."59
In Doe v. Dolton Elementary School Dist.," the court applied the AMA
factors to an HIV infected school child and found that there was no signifi-
cant risk of transmission. The court stated that "[i]nfection with the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV-I) does not present a hazard to others in the
school or workplace (except in a hospital setting).",6' However, a more care-
ful analysis of the safety precautions in the hospital environment and the
AMA factors will show that in most circumstances a HCW will be otherwise
qualified for the purposes of section 504.
IV. HIV INFECTED HCWs AS "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED HANDICAPPED
PERSONS" UNDER SECTION 504
In the event that a HCW is denied employment or is terminated from his
or her present position, to maintain a cause of action under section 504
56. Id. at 1291, 1287. Tuberculosis is spread by the cough of an infected person.
Although TB germs are expelled into the air this way, 99.9% of these germs will die immedi-
ately. Id. at 1287. If the surviving .1% are inhaled by an uninfected person, the germ can settle
in the distal portion of the person's lungs. Id. at 1287-88. It is only here that the organism can
multiply. In most cases, the body's immune system can destroy the germ, but occasionally the
organism does multiply. Even in those cases where the TB germ does multiply, only about 5%
of these people will ever experience progression of the infection to the point where they become
ill. Id. at 1288.
57. Id. at 1291. Incidence of infection has been shown to be positively related to the
amount of time one is exposed to an infectious individual. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
much higher rates of transmission to occur among family members than among coworkers.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1292.
60. 694 F. Supp. 440, 445.
61. Id. But see Local 1812, American Fed. of'Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of
State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987) (where HIV infected employees were not otherwise qual-
ified for overseas duty because of the potential problems with medical care abroad).
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against an employer the HCW will first have to prove that he or she is handi-
capped. Second, the HCW must show that he or she is otherwise qualified.
Finally, the HCW must prove that the denial of employment was the result
of his or her handicap. Once this is established the burden shifts to the
employer to rebut the inference that the employer acted in a discriminatory
manner.
62
The HHS regulations provided that an "otherwise" qualified handicapped
person is one "who [is] qualified except for rather than in spite of [his or her]
handicap" and who can "with reasonable accommodation perform the es-
sential functions of the job in question.",63 As a means of clarification, in
1988 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act64 and further ex-
cepted from the definition of handicapped:
[a]n individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection
and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by
reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to
perform the duties of the job.6 5
Thus, a determination of "otherwise qualified" for a HCW would hinge
upon the AMA factors and whether his AIDS, ARC, or HIV seropositivity
status posed a "direct threat to the health and safety of other individuals."
The Court in Arline instructs courts making these determinations to "defer
to the reasonable judgments of public health officials." 66
An analysis of the AMA factors will demonstrate that in nearly all situa-
tions HIV infected HCWS should be otherwise qualified for the purpose of
section 504. In Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of Calif.,6 the
Department of Education assigned a teacher who was diagnosed with HIV
infection to an administrative position. The department refused to allow
him to teach students in the classroom. The lower court, following the Ar-
line decision, evaluated the teacher's case using the AMA factors. The dis-
trict court judge determined that "the duration of the risk was long and the
severity was 'catastrophic,' but that scientifically established methods of
transmission were unlikely to occur and that the probability of harm was
62. Broadus, Arline: The Application of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to Communicable
Disease, 39 LAB. L. J. 273, 279 (1988) (citing Pushkin v. Univ. of Col., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th
Cir. 1981)); Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985); Doe v. New York Univ., 666
F.2d 761 (2nd Cir. 1981); Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1987). See supra text accompanying note 40.
64. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
65. Id.'at 31-32, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.).
66. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). (The CDC and AMA
are "public health officials.").
67. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
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minimal."' 6' However, the judge went on to state that although he believed
that the risk was small, there was not enough evidence about AIDS that
insured complete certainty that the disease would not transmitted.69
On appeal, the court pointed out the error of the district court: As "[little
in science can be proved with complete certainty ... Section 504 does not
require such a test."7 The court referred to the Arline opinion in which the
Supreme Court stated that exclusion is only allowable if "significant risk of
communicating an infectious disease to others" exists.71 Thus, in referring
to the current medical knowledge of the disease, the Chalk court, as well as
the courts in Thomas, Ray and District 27 Community School Bd. found that
the transmission of AIDS in a classroom setting was not significant or was
merely a "theoretical possibility." 72
Although these cases all involved classroom settings, a similar analysis
can be made for the health care environment. Because transmission of
HTLV-III/LAV from HCWS to patients is not known to have ever occurred
before,73 it is highly improbable that a court will be able to successfully hold
that an HIV-infected HCW poses a "direct threat to the health and safety"
of patients or to co-workers. In addition, although HTLV-III/LAV is trans-
missible via blood-to-blood contact, the CDC has issued guidelines74 main-
taining that the risk of transmission is only prevalent where both "a high
degree of trauma to the patient that would provide a portal of entry for the
virus (e.g., during invasive procedures)"7 5 and contact with "blood or serous
fluid from the infected HCW to the open tissue of a patient, as could occur if
the HCW sustains a needle stick or scalpel injury during an invasive proce-
68. Id. at 707.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 707.
71. Id. at 708 (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 286 n.16
(1987).
72. Id.; Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 380 (C.D. Cal.
1987); Ray v, School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1987);
District 27 Community School Board v. Bd. of Educ., 130 Misc. 2d 398, 408, 502 N.Y.S. 2d
325, 335-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986). •
73. Recommendations, supra note 2, at 15 (1987). Although one AIDS-infected surgeon
operated on 400 patients over a 5 year period, to date none of his patients have tested positive
for HIV infection. Green, supra note 11, at 38.
74. The CDC guidelines, known as "the universal precautions" are procedures designed
to decrease the risk of transmitting infectious disease in the health care environment.
Although, at the time of this writing, the CDC guidelines are not "law," OSHA has issued a
proposed rule and notice of hearing that follows the CDC recommendations. See also infra
note 124 and accompanying text; Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 54 Fed.
Reg. 23,042 (proposed May 30, 1989); Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals and AIDS:
The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients," 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 26
(1989).
75. Summary, supra note 19, at 691.
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dure."' 7 6 Further, the CDC recommends that HCWs "who do not perform
invasive procedures need not be restricted from work unless they have evi-
dence of other infection or illness for which any HCW should be re-
stricted."' 77 Thus, those individuals who are merely seropositive for HIV
and do not participate in invasive procedures will probably always be found
to be "otherwise qualified" for protection under the Act.7"
Because the regulations require the employer to provide reasonable ac-
commodation for handicapped employees, those individuals with ARC and
those individuals who are seropositive and perform invasive procedures will
likely fall into the purview of statutory protection. The CDC precautions
recommend that hospitals require all HCWs, "regardless of whether they
perform invasive procedures" to wear gloves at all times where direct con-
tact with body fluids or nonintact skin may occur. 79 The CDC suggests that
all HCWs to use "appropriate barrier precautions" including gloves, protec-
tive eyewear, face shields, gowns and aprons (during invasive procedures) to
reduce the possibility of contact with blood and other bodily fluids.8 0 At
present, according to the current state of medical knowledge, these precau-
tions are belived to vitiate the risk of transmission of HIV infection in the
health care environment both from HCW to patient and among HCWs.
Thus, upon evaluation, a court will likely find that a hospital must institute
these precautions in order to "reasonably accommodate" an afflicted em-
76. Id.
77. Id. HIV-infected HCWs who do not perform invasive procedures should only be re-
moved from "direct patient care" if they refuse to abide by the CDC guidelines. See also
Comment, supra note 30, at 122.
78. This question has arisen in the health care environment. On September 11, 1986,
James Kautz, a surgical technician, filed a complaint against his employer Humana Hospital in
Orlando, Florida. Kautz, who tested positive for HIV infection, was told by the hospital's
personnel director that he would be terminated if he did not either resign or take medical
leave. Although he did not have any health problems, Kautz took medical leave from his
position. The complaint against Humana alleged that the hospital discriminated against
Kautz by "perceiving" him as being handicapped and incapable of performing the duties of his
job. Kautz, as of September 1986, was employed by a California hospital. Charge, supra note
44. Applying the preceding analysis, it should be determined that Humana Hospital's policy
for dealing with seropositive employees illegally discriminates against otherwise qualified
handicapped individuals. See also infra note 81, where a hospital that had denied staff privi-
leges to a physician with AIDS reversed its position. Ben Wolf, an attorney with the American
Civil Liberties Union, stated that the hospital which had "initially tak[en] action which would
fuel irrational fears and harm the public health, ha[d] now recognized that discrimination
against people with AIDS is unwarranted." AIDS-Infected Doctor, Hospital Sign Consent De-
cree Restoring Privileges, 26 Gov't Emp. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 411 (Mar. 14, 1988) (hereinafter
AIDS-Infected Doctor).
79. Summary, supra note 19, at 691.
80. Recommendations, supra note 2, at 7.
Hospitals and AIDS Discrimination
ployee.8  At this point, seropositive HCWs who perform invasive proce-
dures as well as HCWs who manifest symptoms of ARC or AIDS (but do
not presently suffer from any other opportunistic infections) would be
"otherwise qualified" because they would probably pose neither a "signifi-
cant risk" of transmitting the disease nor a "direct threat to the health or
safety of others." 82
Hospitals would then be justified in excluding only a limited group of in-
fected HCWs. The CDC recommends that those individuals who have "ex-
udative lesions or weeping dermatitis should refrain from all direct patient
care and from handling patient-care equipment until the condition re-
solves."83 Thus, a hospital probably could not legally exclude such individu-
als from employment. For these individuals, a temporary suspension from
this type of duty would be a suitable accommodation under the Act.84 Ac-
commodation is not reasonable when it causes "undue financial and admin-
istrative burden" or if it requires a "fundamental alteration in the nature of
the program.",85
Therefore, the question of protection under the Act will probably arise
only with regard to those individuals who suffer from the full-blown AIDS
syndrome. Because the CDC maintains that the hospital should make an
individual assessment of each afflicted HCW, the questions involved with
81. In March of last year, a suit by an AIDS-afflicted physician who had been denied staff
privileges at Cook County Hospital was settled by a consent decree. The agreement provided
that the doctor would comply with the CDC recommendations. In addition, the doctor was
required to wear two pairs of gloves during certain specified invasive procedures and would
refrain from performing 3 other particular procedures. Finally, the agreement stated that the
hospital would "reasonably accommodate [the doctor's] physical and mental limitations by
modifying or adjusting his duties and responsibilities to the extent possible to permit him to
continue to engage in as many of his job duties as he can competently perform." AIDS-In-
fected Doctor, supra note 78 (emphasis added).
82. See Doe v. Cook County, No. 87 C. 6888 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1988), reported in AIDS-
Infected Doctor, supra note 78 (where, pursuant to a consent decree, an AIDS-afflicted physi-
cian's staff privileges were reinstated and the agreement provided that the hospital could make
changes in the doctor's duties if he were ever to "pose a significant health risk to himself or
others."). But note the AMA maintains that seropositive HCWs have "an ethical obligation to
voluntarily withdraw from performing invasive procedures." Comment, supra note 30, at 119
n.94, 124 (citing Ethical Issues Involved in Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 J. A.M.A. 1360, 1361
(1988)).
83. Summary, supra note 19, at 691.
84. Reasonable accommodation includes modification of work schedules, including part-
time employment and job restructuring. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (App. A) (1987).
85. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (citing South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979)). Cf Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F.
Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987), where a postal worker who suffered from achondroplastic dwarf-
ism could not be reasonably accommodated. The court found that bringing a step stool into
this working environment would be a safety hazard both to Dexler and to his coworkers,
would lower efficiency and would thus be unduly financially burdensome.
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decision making on the part of the hospital become very complex.16 While
these individuals may or may not be considered a "direct threat to health
and safety of others" or a "significant risk of transmitting the disease," it
may not be necessary for a court to make such a determination. The Civil
Rights Restoration Act also exempts from the definition of handicapped
those individuals whose disease renders them "unable to perform the duties
of the job in question."87 An individual who suffers from the full-blown
AIDS syndrome will likely be too ill to work most of; the time.8 8 This indi-
vidual will often times be afflicted with one or more other opportunistic dis-
eases to which he is susceptible. Either as a function of his physical
incapacitation or because of his infectiousness as a result of these other op-
portunistic illnesses, this HCW will probably fail to satisfy the definition of
handicapped under the "unable to perform the duties of the job"
requirement.
Thus, with the possible exception of those individuals who suffer from the
full-blown AIDS syndrome, all HCWs who have AIDS, ARC or are HIV-
seropositive should, in most cases, be found to be "otherwise qualified." Be-
cause the CDC recommendations are to be implemented with respect to all
HCWs regardless of HIV-status, the precautions suggested should be held to
be "reasonable accommodation." A court would probably not be justified in
concluding that these procedures amount to "a fundamental alteration in the
nature of the program" nor that they are "unduly financially burdensome."
In addition, it is notable that in the interests of safety, taking such precau-
tions are in the hospital's best interest.8 9 It is highly unlikely that any hospi-
tal would refuse to implement these procedures. Thus, by including HIV-
infected HCWs within the definition of "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividuals," courts will be implementing the congressional intent to vitiate
discrimination based on "pernicious mythologies" or "irrational fear. '
86. Comment, supra note 30, at 120.
87. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS. (102 Stat.) 31-32.
88. However, if an individual who suffers from the full-blown AIDS syndrome is not too
ill to work, and is not afflicted with any other contagious diseases, he will probably be found to
be otherwise qualified. Individuals who can be reasonably accommodated under such circum-
stances will also be found to be otherwise qualified.
89. Hospitals have an obligation to their patients to protect them from acquiring infec-
tions in the hospital. Kelly, Overview of Health Care Issues, in AIDS AND THE LAW 245 (W.
Dornette ed. 1987) (citing Harris v. Huey P. Long Hosp. 378 So. 2d. 383 (La. 1979)).
90. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of California, 840 F.2d 701, 711 (9th
Cir. 1988) (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284, 285 n.12 (1987)).
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V. THE ADA: A PROPOSAL FOR INCREASED PROTECTION
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
A. Overview of the ADA: Proposed Changes in Federal Protection For
Disabled Employees
On May 9, 1989, the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)91 was intro-
duced in the Senate. Although the Act was not passed by the 101st Con-
gress, it is discussed here because the proposed law, if enacted, would extend
the scope of protection against employment discrimination for disabled
Americans to the private sector.92 Moreover, for individuals whose handi-
cap is HIV infection, the legislative history of the proposed Act indicates
that the statutory definition of "disabled" would include individuals who
have AIDS, ARC, and who are asymptomatic seropositive.93
The ADA, as drafted was intended "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties94. . . [and] to provide enforceable standards [for] addressing discrimina-
tion against individuals with [handicaps]."9" Although section 504
demonstrated congressional intent "to prevent discrimination against and
expand employment opportunities for handicapped individuals," 96 the stated
purpose of the ADA reflected its more affirmative approach of dealing with
discrimination.
As proposed the Act addressed discrimination in a number of contexts
and prohibited employment discrimination.97 This general prohibition is,
not surprisingly, very similar to proposed section 504. Furthermore, many
91. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). When this comment went to print, the Act had
been refered to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the 101st Congress
in second session. The House was also considering a similar Act.
92. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). C.f section 504 discussed supra which applies
only to programs which receive federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). See generally Leonard,
AIDS Employment and Unemployment, 49.OH1o ST. L.J. 929, 942-43 (1989) (for a discussion
of proposed legislation which would extend protection of federal discrimination laws to indi-
viduals affected with HIV).
93. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989). The committee and subcommittee
both heard testimony from the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Epidemic. Id. at 6. This information, as well as testimony from representatives of other
groups of disabled Americans, supported the Committees' decision to expand the application
of federal discrimination legislation.
94. Id. at 2. The Committee explains that the term "disability" rather than the term
"handicap" is used within the text of the Act to reflect a more "up-to-date" use of "currently
accepted terminology." Id. at 21.
95. Id. at 2.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1982).
97. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1989). The ADA also prohibits discrimination
against disabled individuals by Public Services and Public Accommodations and Services oper-
ated by private entities.
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of the definitions relevant to section 504 have been incorporated in whole or
in part throughout the proposed Act.98 The significance of the ADA as pro-
posed, is that it would have extended the coverage of the Act to private
sector employers99 and not limited coverage to programs receiving federal
financial assistance. "
B. The Proposed Mandate
The ADA, if passed, would have prohibited employers (and other "cov-
ered entities")10 from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a
disability in regard to ... the hiring or discharge of employees."' 2 Under
the proposed ADA, the definition of a qualified individual with a disability is
almost identical to the definition of an "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual under section 504."103 Furthermore, the ADA would have incor-
porated the HHS regulations defining "otherwise qualified" into its
definition of "qualified individual."" °  Therefore without the protection of
the ADA, although a disabled individual can show the elements required by
section 504 to prove discrimination, if the action was taken by a private
sector employer the employee will not be able to bring suit under section
504. If the ADA had become law, however, an individual could have
brought a cause of action under federal discrimination laws by meeting sub-
stantially the same test required by section 504.105 Thus an HIV-infected
HCW who is an otherwise qualified handicapped individual under section
504, would also be found to be a qualified individual with a disability for the
98. S. REP. No. 116. 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1989). These definitions have been dis-
cussed in previous sections with respect to section 504.
99. See S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(4) (1989) (limitations on the term
"employer").
100. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
101. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(2) (1989). Covered entities include employment
agencies, labor organizations and joint labor committees.
102. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1989). Cf the statutory prohibition of section
504, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(1988); S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(2) (1989). "The term
'disability' means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
104. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(7) (1989). A qualified individual with a disability
"means an individual with a disability, who with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position." Cf 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1987),
supra note 40.
105. Today, these individuals are limited to bringing their claims under the appropriate
state law in their jurisdiction.
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purposes of Title I of the ADA. Thus, the proposed law substantially in-
creases the number of individuals who may bring suit against their
employers.
Title I of the ADA as proposed specifically stated that covered entities
may not discriminate against a qualified disabled individuals with respect to
a job application or the hiring or discharge of employees. 10 6 The proposed
Act lists eight examples of "discrimination." Although most of these provi-
sions of the Act prohibit the use of tests or selection criteria that would
screen out disabled individuals, one section imposes an affirmative duty on
the employer to make reasonable accommodation for a disabled applicant or
employee.'o 7 Here, the ADA again appears to mirror the judicial interpreta-
tions of section 504. 108 Both the ADA and section 504 define reasonable
accommodation as modifications that do not cause undue hardship to the
operation of the employer's business.' 09 The ADA, however, went a step
further and set out factors that an employer should consider when determin-
ing whether an activity constitutes an undue hardship.110 Thus, the em-
ployer's duty to provide a reasonable accommodation, under the ADA is
substantially the same as an employer's obligation under the provisions of
section 504. In the hospital context, the analysis of reasonable accommoda-
tion under the ADA would be identical to the analysis under section 504."
C. HIV Infection Under the ADA
Although the text of the ADA does not specifically address infectious dis-
eases such as HIV-infection, the legislative history of the Act indicates the
way in which the Senate intended HIV-infected individuals to be treated.
The issue at these hearings was a public policy interest in eliminating dis-
crimination based on irrational fears and myths about disabled individu-
als." 2 The senate report cited a statement made by Admiral James
Watkins' that "discrimination against individuals with HIV infection is
106. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1989).
107. Id. at § 102(5).
108. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1987), supra notes 40 and 63 and accompanying text.
109. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(5) (1989). See supra note 84 (citing Southeastern
Community College and Arline).
110. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(9)(B) (1989). The proposed act requires the em-
ployer to consider, among other things, the size of the business, the nature and type of busi-
ness, and the nature and cost of the accommodation.
111. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
112. The senate report cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Arline See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
113. Admiral Watkins is the former chairman of the President's Commission of the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic.
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widespread."' 4 Because the purpose of the ADA was to end discrimination
against disabled individuals, the inclusion of this comment in the senate re-
port indicates that the Senate intended for HIV-infected individuals to be
protected as "disabled" individuals under the Act. Furthermore, the senate
report, again citing the presidential commission, stated that, "[a]ll persons
with symptomatic or asymptomatic HIV infection should clearly be in-
cluded as persons with disabilities who are covered by antidiscrimination
protections of this legislation."'1 5 Thus, it is clear that the Senate, consistent
with the public policy objectives that are relevant to HIV discrimination,
intended for individuals who have AIDS, ARC or are merely seropositive to
be protected under the ADA as proposed.
Under the proposed ADA, employers would, however retain the power of
discretion. They would not be under a duty to "prefer applicants with disa-
bilities over other applicants on the basis of disability."1" 6 Furthermore, the
legislative history of the proposed Act indicates that the Senate intended for
the provisions of the Civil Rights Restoration Act 1 7 to be applicable to the
ADA as well. The senate report specifically states that "[i]t is also accepta-
ble to deny employment to an applicant or to fire an employee with a disabil-
ity on the basis that the individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others." ' Therefore, as is true for section 504, because imple-
mentation of the CDC universal precautions is believed to significantly de-
crease the likelihood of transmitting the virus, only very few (if any) HIV-
infected HCWs will pose "a direct threat to health and safety." 1 9 The sen-
ate report goes on to state that in any case where an employer wishes to
remove or refuse to hire a disabled individual, "the employer must identify
the specific risk that the individual would pose."1 20 Further, if the employer
is concerned that the person poses a "significant risk to the health and safety
of others," the employer must further show that no reasonable accommoda-
tion is available to remove the risk."'2 Thus, the analysis under Title I of the
ADA would be substantially the same as the analysis under section 504.
The law would require that the hospital, whether public or private, make an
individualized assessment of the infected HCW and identify the particular
risk posed by the individual. The hospital, then, would have to show that no
reasonable accommodation is available that would remove the risk. Because
114. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989).
115. Id. at 19.
116. Id. at 26-27.
117. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
118. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 27 (1989).
119. See supra notes 79-82.
120. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989).
121. Id.
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of the availability of methods that can decrease the risk of transmission in
the health care environment, it will be difficult to show that HIV-infected
HCWs pose a direct threat to health and safety.1 22
VI. SAFETY' IN THE HOSPITAL ENVIRONMENT:
POSSIBILITY OF LIABILITY
Safety in the health care environment is undeniably a paramount concern
for hospitals. The question that naturally arises in the context of HIV-in-
fected HCWs is that of hospital liability within the context of patient and co-
worker safety. Generally, the hospital's duty to its patients requires the im-
plementation of "reasonable rules and standards."'' 2 3 Should the CDC rec-
ommendations become regarded as an accepted standard of care, injuries to
patients proximately caused by the failure to follow these regulations may
result in liability to hospitals.1 24 However, the mere fact that a hospital,
exercising its own judgment, summarily decides that HIV-infected employ-
ees pose a safety risk will not justify discrimination. The Supreme Court,
while recognizing the importance of safety in the workplace, held in Western
Airlines v. Criswell, 25 that "even in cases involving public safety" the court
may not give complete deference to an employer's assessment.'2 6 The judi-
cial decisions dealing with section 504 and infectious diseases have been
clear in recognizing that "community fear ... and the possibility of lawsuits
• .. as real as they may be cannot be allowed to vitiate the rights"'127 of these
individuals. Thus, while hospitals may fear liability stemming from the pos-
122. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
123. Standards are based on hospital bylaws, rules and regulations and Accreditation Stan-
dards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. Trail, Hospital Liability and the
Staff Privileges Dilemma, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 315, 326 (1985) (citing Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d. 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1966)) for the principle that violation of a rule may be evidence of a breach of a standard of
care for the purpose of imposing liability on a hospital.).
124. Because the CDC's universal precautions are recommendations, it has been stated that
at present they are not a recognized standard of care. Failure to implement the CDC precau-
tions could be used as evidence of "voluntary standards" of an "association" of which the
hospital "was not a member ... [it] would not automatically establish a standard practice."
Macher, The Medical Background, in AIDS AND THE LAW 24 (W. Dornette ed. 1987). See
generally, Hermann, Hospital Liability and AIDS Treatment: The Need for a National Stan-
dard of Care, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 441 (Spring 1987). But note, a proposed rule has been
issued by the Department of Labor and OSHA incorporating much of the substance of the
CDC guidelines into regulations. See supra note 74.
125. 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (claim brought by a pilot under the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act (ADEA)).
126. Id. at 423.
127. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, Cent. Dist. of California, 840 F.2d 701, 711 (9th
Cir. 1988) (citing New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479, 485
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd. 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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sible injury to patients from infected HCWs, these fears should not justify
discrimination. 2 8 Hospitals should still be required to make an individual
assessment of each HCW's health and examine the utility of reasonable ac-
commodation in every case.
12 9
Like other employers, the hospital's duty to its employees, is controlled by
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act). 3 ' Under the Act, the
hospital is under a duty to provide its employees with a workplace which is
"free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm."' 131 If a hospital implements the CDC guidelines,
it is unlikely that non-infected HCWs will be able to refuse to work with an
AIDS, ARC, or HIV-seropositive co-worker. The OSH Act and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protect workers from being forced to
work in an environment where they have a "reasonable apprehension of seri-
ous injury and no less burdensome alternative exists" or under "abnormally
dangerous conditions."' 3 2 Employers with employees who fall under pro-
tection of these statutes may not take action against them for their refusal to
work. ' 33 However, based on the current medical knowledge of the disease, a
hospital following the CDC guidelines would not be seen as providing an
"abnormally dangerous" working environment and a HCW would not be
justifed in the belief that death or serious harm will come to him as a result
of working with an infected HCW.'34 These circumstances would once
again demonstrate the courts' desire to dispel the "accumulated myths and
fears"'135 regarding HIV infection.
128. See supra note 89.
129. The employer must make a careful analysis of the handicapped employee and his
position in order to demonstrate that his decision was not based on stereotype or prejudice.
Broadus, supra note 62, at 275 (citing Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985)).
130. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1982).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c); National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982).
133. Michael S. Cecere, at a conference entitled "AIDS: Legal Aspects of a Medical Cri-
sis," stated that workers in this kind of situation would not be protected under OSH Act
because AIDS is not transmitted "through conduct [i.e. intimate conduct] one expects to occur
in the workplace." Focus, supra note 6, at 1615. But c.f Arthur S. Leonard stated at the same
conference that the result of such action on the part of workers would turn on the reasonable-
ness of the employee's actions, that is "whether [a] good faith belief [that he is in danger of
contracting AIDS] exists when an employee is acting on rumor, hearsay and ignorance." Fo-
cus, supra note 6, at 1615.
134. The CDC recommendations can be used as evidence of voluntary standards. It is also
important to note here that a HCW who contracts AIDS as a result of working with an in-
fected hospital-employee could probably maintain a negligence action against the hospital if
the hospital was not implementing the CDC guidelines. State Labor Law Developments, 2
LAB. L. 382, 390 (1986).
135. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284-85 (1987).
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VII. STAFF PRIVILEGES: APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 504
Traditionally, the hospital's role in the medical career of a physician was
limited to providing a place for his practice.' 3 6 Thus, the ability of a doctor
to practice medicine was dependent on his ability to acquire staff privileges
at a hospital. Early on, courts recognized the importance of staff privileges,
but placed the power of the decision making process in the hospital board.'37
In 1927, the Supreme Court held that a license to practice medicine did not
bestow upon a doctor a constitutional right to staff privileges at a hospital.'38
Currently, it is unclear whether physicians who have AIDS, ARC or are
HIV-seropositive and are not employed by a hospital but who, by virtue of
staff privileges, are affiliated with a hospital are protected under federal dis-
crimination laws. 139 Upon a careful examination, however, it seems likely
that doctors who are otherwise qualified will fall into the purview of statu-
tory protection. Although physicians who experience employment discrimi-
nation can bring suit under Title VII, ADEA, or the Rehabilitation Act,
most of the cases that have come to bar have been brought pursuant to Title
VII. 14 Because the underlying philosophy of the Rehabilitation Act is simi-
lar to Title VII, 4 ' an examination of these cases will reveal that circum-
stances giving rise to a Title VII claim will probably support maintenance of
a section 504 action for claims of staff privileges discrimination.'42 Deci-
sions regarding the applicability of the law to staff physicians will focus pri-
marily on the nature of the physician-hospital employment relationship. 4 3
136. Trail, supra note 123, at 316.
137. See Annotation, Exclusion of or Discrimination Against Physician or Surgeon By Hos-
pital, 37 A.L.R. 3d. 645 (1971).
138. Hayman v. Gavleston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
139. Hartstein, EEO Issues in the Health-Care Field: A Roundup of Recent Developments,
12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 241, 258 (1986). See also supra notes 78, 81, and 82 (describing Doe
v. Cook County, No. 87 C 6888 (N.D. III Feb. 24, 1988), where an action by an AIDS-afflicted
physician who was denied staff privileges was settled by a consent decree.)
140. See Comment, supra note 30, at 124.
141. Broadus, supra note 62, at 275.
142. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984); EEOC v. Zippo, 713 F.2d 32,
38 (3rd Cir. 1983); Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Amro v. St. Luke's Hosp., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1574 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Pao v. Holy
Redeemer Hosp., 547 F. Supp. 484, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Also, note that the analysis that follows regarding section 504 cases would probably be
equally applicable to ADA cases, if that act was ever to become law.
143. In the past, this analysis also required a determination of the public or private nature
of the hospital. Traditionally, the issue of whether hospital decisions regarding staff privileges
are subject to judicial review has hinged on the characterization of the hospital as a public or
private institution. While the decisions of private hospitals have been left to the discretion of
the hospital governing boards. Annotation, supra note 137, at 645. However, today the trend
of the courts has been toward "equating public and private institutions." A. SOUTHWICK,
THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 378 (1978). Thus, the dis-
19901
216 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 6:193
Because in many cases, doctors who have staff privileges are not "employ-
ees" of the hospital where they practice, the applicability of employment
discrimination legislation is at issue."' In general, due to the public policy
considerations involved in such cases, the courts have been fairly flexible in
finding an employment relationship in these situations..
In Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson,' 45 the court interpreted Title VII as
extending beyond the bounds of an ordinary employment relationship. In
that case, a male nurse filed a claim based on sex discrimination. The nurse,
a member of a nurse's registry organization, was referred to care for certain
patients. However, the hospital refused to allow him to care for female pa-
tients. Although he had no employment. relationship with the hospital, the
court found that Title VII had a broader scope than the confines of the ordi-
nary employment relationship.' 46 Rather than prohibiting discrimination
against employees, Title VII uses the word "individuals" and the court
therefore felt justified in refraining from "restrict[ing the] references in the
Act to 'any individual' as comprehending only an employee of an em-
ployer."' 47 Because the goal of the Act is to provide "equality of employ-
ment opportunities," the court found that Congress sought to prohibit
discrimination in employment where "[c]ontrol over access to the job mar-
ket may reside." '148 Similarly, in actions under section 504, a court will look
to the purpose of that Act. Because the congressional intent under section
504 is "to prevent discrimination against and expand employment opportu-
nities for handicapped individuals,"' 9 a similar justification could be em-
ployed in these cases. Thus, courts will probably be flexible in finding an
employment relationship in section 504 cases as well. In addition, section
504, like Title VII, is not limited in its language to the employment context.
The Act prohibit discrimination against "qualified handicapped individu-
tinction between public and private institutions is no longer as important to the analysis as it
once had been. See United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert denied 107 S.Ct. 958 (1985); Northeast Georgia Radiological Associates v. Tidwell, 670
F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1982); Jackson v. Norton's Children's Hosp., 487 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1973);
Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971);
Bello v. South Shore Hosp., 384 Mass. 770, 429 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (1981); Sams v. Ohio
Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n., 149 W. Va. 229, 140 S.E.2d 457 (1965).
144. Hartstein, supra note 139, at 257. See also A. SOUTHWICK, supra note 143. "In gen-
eral, a staff physician with no closer relationship to the hospital corporation than having the
privilege of treating his private patients who are hospitalized there, is not an employee of the
institution." Under these circumstances the staff physician is an independent contractor.
145. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
146. Id. at 1341.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1340-41.
149. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8).
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als."'5 ° Thus, because the two Acts are similarly worded and have consis-
tent goals, judicial interpretations of section 504 are likely to be similar to
those of Title VII and will thus allow for enough flexibility to encompass
more than the traditional employer-employee relationship.
In Amro v. St. Luke's Hosp. , " the court dealt directly with staff privileges
and discrimination. The court pointed out that the provision of Title VII
pertaining to unlawful employment practices only prohibits employers from
taking such discriminatory actions. In that case, the plaintiff, Dr. Amro,
had brought a Title VII claim on the theory that he was denied staff privi-
leges because of his Palestinian national origin. The court implemented a
"hybrid test" to determine whether an employment relationship existed.
The court, using the factors set out by EEOC v. Zippo,15 2 considered the
''economic realities" of the relationship as well as:
(1) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work is
usually done under the direction of supervisor or is done by a spe-
cialist without supervision; (2) the skill required in the particular
occupation; (3) whether the 'employer' or the individual in ques-
tion furnishes the equipment used and the place of work; (4) the
length of time during which the individual has worked; (5) the
method of payment, whether by time or by the job; (6) the manner
in which the work relationship is terminated; i.e., by one or both
parties, with or without notice and explanation; (7) whether annual
leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the
business of the 'employer'; (9) whether the worker accumulates re-
tirement benefits; (10) whether the 'employer' pays social security
taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties.153
Upon analysis, the court found that "the only factor which suggests an em-
ployer-employee relationship is the fact that the doctor utilizes the hospital's
equipment and works in the hospital."1 54 In finding that a doctor with staff
privileges could not be characterized as an employee of the hospital, the
court pointed to the fact that such doctors are not salaried, 55 do not receive
150. "The term 'individual' implies that it is not necessary for a person to have a direct
employment relationship to receive protection" under section 504. Comment, supra note 30,
at 1242-45.
151. 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1574 (1986).
152. 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3rd. Cir. 1983).
153. Amro, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1576 (quoting Zippo, 713 F.2d at 37 quot-
ing from Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
154. Amro, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1576.
155. Salary arrangements between hospitals and doctors are becoming more frequent.
Where such arrangements exist the hospital may be liable for the physician's negligence under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus, it is likely that salary arrangement may provide
courts with a route to find an employment relationship. SOUTHWICK, supra note 143, at 378.
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any kind of compensation in the form of retirement benefits or vacation
plans, and that the hospital does not supervise the work of staff
physicians. 156
The court, however, did manage to find an employment relationship in
this case. Noting that Title VII protects individuals in the "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment," the court looked to the fact that Amro
had established, as a surgical resident of St. Luke's, "a prior. contractual
relationship" with the hospital." 7 Thus, relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding,' the court concluded that at St.
Luke's, consideration for staff privileges was a fringe benefit of employ-
ment.'59 Although his resident contract did not provide for such, the rela-
tionship had been established and Dr. Amro qualified for protection under
Title VII.6o
Because Title VII and section 504 have similar language and are sup-
ported by compatible policies, the analysis for actions under section 504
should be quite similar to these cases. Thus, absent a prior contractual rela-
tionship, courts using this "hybrid test" may decline to find an employment
relationship for doctors with hospital staff privileges. However, should a
court decide to follow the example developed in Pao v. Holy Redeemer
Hosp.,161 there is a greater likelihood that an employment relationship will
be found. In that case, a Chinese doctor brought suit under Title VII on the
theory that he was denied staff privileges on the basis of his Chinese ethnic
background."6 2 The court, rather than applying the hybrid test, looked only
at the economic control that the hospital had over the doctor's practice. 16 3
The court found that because the hospital had influence over the physician's
ability find prospective patients hospital's control over his access to other
employment opportunities was significant. 4 Therefore, an employment re-
lationship existed and the hospital could not discriminate, against the
physician.
156. Amro, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1576.
157. Id. at 1577. As a surgical resident, Dr. Amro had made several one-year employment
contracts with St. Luke's Hospital.
158. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
159. Dr. Amro was the first resident "in the history of the hospital" who was denied the
opportunity to apply for staff privileges at the end of his residency. Amro, 39 Fair Emp. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 1577.
160. Id.
161. 547 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
162. Id. at 488.
163. Id. at 494.
164. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Over the next several years, as the incidence of HIV infection continues to
rise, employment issues in the hospital environment will become even more
crucial. The public policy interest in protecting persons with HIV infection
as "disabled" will be taken into account in cases arising with respect to HIV
infected individuals and employment discrimination. The legislative intent
of section 504 indicates that the goal of the law is to dispel the public's un-
warranted fear and belief in myths with respect to disabled persons. The
cases discussed above have shown that courts are willing to interpret section
504 to include seropositive, ARC-afflicted and AIDS-individuals within the
purview of protection. Furthermore, the legislative history of the proposed
ADA demonstrates that the Senate favors legislation which would protect
these individuals. This policy demonstrates an effort to curb the prejudice
based on hysteria and fear that has been associated with HIV infection.
It appears that the implementation of CDC recommended guidelines will,
in most cases protect hospitals from liability and section 504 will protect
infected HCWs from discrimination. For the hospital, proper maintenance
of the guidelines should vitiate any possibility of transmission in the health
care environment. The hospital thus should be found to have implemented
reasonable rules and standards to preclude liability in the event that the dis-
ease is spread via HCW to patient. In addition, hospitals should similarly be
found to have maintained a safe workplace should transmission occur
among HCWs. For infected HCWs, section 504 affords considerable job se-
curity. It is fairly certain that a seropositive, ARC or AIDS afflicted HCW
is "handicapped" for the purposes of the statute. Because the risk of trans-
mission is "merely theoretical" and is further decreased by the implementa-
tion of the CDC recommendations, it is highly unlikely that, excepting those
individuals with full-blown AIDS who are unable to work, an infected HCW
will be found to be "otherwise qualified."
Because section 504 is directed at employers, infected staff physicians may
have a more difficult time finding protection under the Act. Although, their
condition would not prevent these doctors from being "otherwise qualified,"
because of their employment relationship with the hospitals, maintenance of
such a cause of action would depend on the test that the court chooses to
implement. The public policy considerations surrounding the issue will very
likely influence the courts' decisions. Because the goal of the Act is to pro-
vide opportunity to the handicapped and because the public policy regarding
HIV infection has been focused towards removing the obstacles of discrimi-
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nation for the afflicted, courts will likely extend the purview of the employ-
ment relationship in this context.
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